Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 41
Number 3 Spring 2007

pp.1143-1164

Spring 2007

A Legal Advisor's Responsibility to the International Community:
When Is Legal Advice a War Crime?
Ellia Ciammaichella

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ellia Ciammaichella, A Legal Advisor's Responsibility to the International Community: When Is Legal
Advice a War Crime?, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1143 (2007).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Ciammaichella: A Legal Advisor's Responsibility to the International Community:

A LEGAL ADVISOR’S RESPONSIBILITY TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:
WHEN IS LEGAL ADVICE A WAR CRIME?
Ellia Ciammaichella*
I. INTRODUCTION
Practically every attorney in every state of the United States of
America takes an oath to uphold the United States and state
Constitutions. Upon taking the oath, most United States lawyers become
an officer of the court (“judicial officer”). Judicial officers are held to a
higher standard of integrity and candor by their state’s professional
responsibility rules. As such, although an attorney is an advocate for his
client, in some situations an attorney must set aside his role as advocate
and assert his role as judicial officer to maintain the integrity of the
judicial system and uphold the United States and state Constitutions.
The constant tension between an attorney’s role as judicial officer
and advocate occurs because giving advice about the law is an attorney’s
main purpose, but often that advice may further criminal conduct.
However, as Professor Newman eloquently stated, “Neither the status of
‘lawyer’ nor the obligation to provide access to the law should exempt
lawyers from the criminal liabilities which face everyone else.”1
While Professor Newman was specifically referring to a lawyer’s
responsibility in the domestic sphere, this is equally applicable to a legal
advisor’s responsibility to the international community. Concededly, an
attorney does not take an oath to uphold international law. However,
because a lawyer should not be exempt from the law, each and every
lawyer, like everyone else, should be legally responsible to the
international community.
This Article argues that there are some limited situations where a
lawyer, specifically a government legal advisor, has certain basic legal
responsibilities to the international community that trump his
responsibility to his government. As the Nuremberg trials emphasized,
no government official is immune from an international crime simply
because he is acting within his official capacity. Rather, the official is
*
J.D., with honors, The George Washington University Law School, 2005; B.S.,
University of California at Berkeley, 2001. Law Clerk for the Honorable Alex R. Munson.
This Article was written in conjunction with Professor Carnahan’s Law of War class at The
George Washington University Law School.
1
Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 288 (1994).
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individually responsible for his actions because the State cannot act
without people to act on its behalf, and only a person acting on behalf of
the State may commit war crimes.2
Furthermore, while a legal advisor is not truly considered a
policymaker, this, by itself, does not dissociate the legal advisor from the
policy. Accordingly, when a legal advisor is so entangled in the policy
such that he breaches his responsibility to the international community,
he must be held accountable for the criminality of that policy.
As such, this Article will analyze the extent of responsibility that a
government legal advisor owes to the international community. As
background, Part II surveys two affirmative defenses that generally arise
when prosecuting a government official for a war crime: official
immunity and immunity for acting pursuant to superior orders. Part III
suggests that an analysis of whether a legal advisor has breached his
international responsibility should depend on a sliding scale test that
considers both the legal advisor’s mens rea and his or her influence over
the illegal policy. Part IV provides practical applications of the
suggested analysis by evaluating four scenarios where a legal advisor is
internationally responsible for playing a significant role in an
international crime.
II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND IMMUNITY
FOR ACTING PURSUANT TO SUPERIOR ORDERS
There are two main issues that, like in prosecuting any other
government official, are relevant to prosecuting a legal advisor as a war
criminal: (1) immunity for acts committed as a high government official;
and (2) immunity for acts made pursuant to superior orders.
A legal advisor may not claim immunity for international crimes
simply because he is acting in his official capacity.3 This follows from
United States v. von Leeb (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10, at 462, 508 (1950) [hereinafter High Command Case]. “The state being but an
inanimate corporate entity or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine policies,
exercise judgment, experience fear, or be restrained or deterred from action except through
its animate agents and representatives.” Id.
3
The International Law Commission (“ILC”) succinctly summarized this in Nuremberg
Principle III: “The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve
him from responsibility under international law.” Principles of International Law Recognized
in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal: Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N.
2

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/7

Ciammaichella: A Legal Advisor's Responsibility to the International Community:

2007]

Legal Advice as a War Crime

1145

two underlying tenets. First, international law is superior to domestic
law, and second, deterrence is greatest where individual responsibility is
placed on the authors of criminal policies. Although the superiority of
international law may simply support State liability, “[i]t would be an
utter disregard of reality and but legal shadow-boxing to say that only
the state, the inanimate entity, can have guilt, and that no guilt can be
attributed to its animate agents who devise and execute its policies.”4
Rather, because the State cannot act on its own and must necessarily act
through the will of its agents, the only way to deter a State’s criminal
action is by making its agents, including legal advisors, criminally
responsible for their personal acts.5
The principle of international law, which under certain
circumstances, protects the representatives of a state,
cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as
criminal by international law. The authors of these acts
cannot shelter themselves behind their official position
in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings.6
Thus, while a legal advisor’s official capacity shields him from most
liability, the legal advisor is directly responsible for his actions that are
criminal under international law.7 In addition, the mere fact that an
Doc.A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 364, 375, U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add [hereinafter Nürnberg Principles] (emphasis omitted); see J.
Spiropoulos, Formulation of Nürnberg Principles, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/22 (1950), reprinted in
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 181, 192, UN. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.1; see also Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10, Corr.1, Corr.2 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 15, pt. 2, 31 U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1, Corr.1 [hereinafter Draft Code of P&SM] (“The official
position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind,
even if he acted as head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility or mitigate punishment.”).
4
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 508.
5
Id. (“The state being but an inanimate corporate entity or concept, it cannot as such
make plans, determine policies, exercise judgment, experience fear, or be restrained or
deterred from action except through its animate agents and representatives.”); United
States v. Göring (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946), in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947), available at http://www.mazal.org/
Default.htm [hereinafter MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS] (“Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”).
6
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 223.
7
Sir Arthur Watts gives a concise explanation of a Head of State’s general protections,
privileges, and immunities. Sir Arthur Watts, Heads of States, Heads of Governments and
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official acts in some other capacity besides a military leader does not
immunize him from international responsibility. For example, although
Joachim von Ribbentrop was the Foreign Policy Adviser to Hitler,8 the
International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) held that even assuming that
von Ribbentrop “was personally concerned with the diplomatic rather
than the military aspect of these actions, his diplomatic efforts were so
closely connected with war that he could not have remained unaware of
the aggressive nature of Hitler’s actions.”9
Furthermore, a person acting in his official capacity as a legal advisor
may not simply shield himself from his initiation or creation of criminal
policy by claiming that his work product is legal advice. For example,
Rudolf Lehmann, Chief of the Legal Department of the Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht (“OKW”), was sentenced to seven years imprisonment
for his “criminal connection” to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, the
Commando Order, and the Night and Fog Decree for either drafting or
formulating the policy behind these illegal orders.10 Similarly, Joachim
von Ribbentrop, although the Foreign Policy Adviser to Hitler, was
convicted of war crimes for his memorandum justifying the Nazi’s
aggressive actions on Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries.11
Concomitant with the principle that one may not claim immunity for
acts within one’s official capacity is that acting pursuant to superior
orders does not necessarily immunize a legal advisor from international
responsibility.12 If a person cannot claim immunity for his official
Foreign Ministers, in 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 35 (1994). Many of these immunities can be
extended, by analogy, to other government officials.
8
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 287.
9
Id.
10
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 690-95. Lehmann drafted the Barbarossa
Jurisdiction Order, which stripped the jurisdiction from the courts and allowed troops
complete discretion to dispose of cases. See infra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text.
Lehman was involved in the formulation of the Commando Order, which directed certain
units that were alleged to have engaged in illegal terrorist activity to be summarily
executed. He also drafted the Night and Fog Decree, which ordered the deportation of
civilians suspected of resistance activities so that they may be tried by special courts within
the Reich.
11
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 286 (“Von Ribbentrop was advised in advance
of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries, and
prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggressive
actions.”); see Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and
Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 694 (2004) (“It is worth recalling that Ribbentrop was
convicted at Nuremberg for having issued memoranda justifying the Nazi preemptive
strikes against Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries in 1940.”).
12
Nürnberg Principles, supra note 3, at 375. This is ILC Principle IV: “The fact that a
person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from
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actions, then a junior person acting pursuant to superior orders may not
claim immunity for obeying or for being influenced by those superior
orders.13
III. COMPLICITY AND MORAL CHOICE
Because a legal advisor is not exempt from international law, to the
extent that a legal advisor is “[c]omplicit[ ] in the commission of . . . a
war crime,” he is acting criminally under international law.14 For
example, under the policymaker rule, a policymaker who creates or
implements a policy, order, legislation, or decree which authorizes or
directs the commission of a crime is a war criminal if the crime was
actually committed in the prosecution of war.15 Generally, a legal
advisor does not fall under the policymaker rule. However, if a war
crime actually occurred, a legal advisor may be criminally responsible
for policy that directed or implemented the war crime if he understands
the consequences of the policy and has enough influence to shape the
policy. In other words, a legal advisor has not committed a war crime
unless he has what the IMT called a “moral choice.”
A. The Theory of Complicity Requires that a War Crime Actually Occur
Because a legal advisor’s international responsibility is based on
complicity, and not conspiracy, the threshold inquiry is whether a war

responsibility under international law.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see Spiropoulos, supra note
3, at 192; see also Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 5 (“The fact that an individual
charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order
of a Government or a superior does not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires.”).
13
A legal advisor acting pursuant to superior orders, however, may not have the
requisite culpability. As mere association to criminal conduct is not sufficient, acting
pursuant to superior orders may effectively negate an essential part of the balancing test
prescribed infra. High Command Case, supra note 2, at 484. Because “criminal
responsibility is an individual matter; . . . criminal guilt must be personal.” Id.
14
Nürnberg Principles, supra note 3, at 377 (emphasis omitted).
15
Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 5; see Agreement by the Government of the
United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis app., art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 15477,
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal] (“Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”); WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY
ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG 503 (rev. ed. 1999) (“War crimes must be
committed in the course of war, and must be related to war prosecution.”).
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crime actually occurred.16
Thus, an official is not individually
responsible if an international standard was not breached17 or if the
breach did not amount to a “grave harm to the international
community.”18
While some international scholars have interpreted the Geneva
Conventions to delineate war crime standards based on whether the
armed conflict was international or non-international in character, the
current customary international law makes no such distinction. During
international armed conflict—that is, armed conflict between two or
more States19—war crimes are acts that constitute a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions.20 Grave breaches include willful killing, torture or

16
Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 2; see, e.g., High Command Case, supra note 2,
at 565 (acquitting Hugo Sperrle because although he may have ordered subordinate units
to force Russian prisoners of war to work in construction units, there was no evidence in
the record that a crime was actually committed).
17
Conspiracy to commit a war crime has not yet risen to the level of international
responsibility. However, because a conspiracy to commit an act of aggression is the
essence of a crime against peace, conspiracy is an international crime in that context.
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 223. Some commentators suggest that conspiracy,
as a war crime, has gained status in the international community. See Howard S. Levie, The
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a
Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 11 n.60 (1995). However, conspiracy
has not risen to the level of customary international law. Richard Barrett and Professor
Laura Little succinctly explained the difference between complicity and conspiracy in
Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 30, 37 (2003).
18
ROBERT K. WOETZEL, NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (2d ed. 1962); see
United States v. List (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1241 (1950)
[hereinafter Hostage Case] (“An international crime is such an act universally recognized
as criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some valid
reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control
over it under ordinary circumstances.”).
19
The definition of international armed conflict is based on Common Article 2. Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [collectively Common Article 2].
20
Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,
16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 783, 800 n.58 (1995); see Geneva Convention I, supra note 19, at art. 49;
Geneva Convention II, supra note 19, at art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, at art.
129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 19, at art. 146; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
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inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health.21
Concededly, when the conflict is not of an international character,
the Geneva Conventions do not explicitly mandate individual
responsibility. Common Article 3, however, creates limited protection to
persons participating in a non-international armed conflict.22
“Guerrillas, therefore, even if unprivileged combatants and not entitled
on capture to the status of prisoners of war, would appear now always to
be entitled to humane treatment and trial by a regular court.”23
Moreover, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) stated that Common
Article 3 is the “minimum yardstick” for any type of armed conflict and
constitutes customary international law.24 Like grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions,
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds,
mutilation,
cruel
treatment
and
torture[,] . . . taking of hostages[,] . . . outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment[,] . . . the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples25
are all concerns that the international community does not take lightly.
Accordingly, if the IMT’s analysis is similarly applicable to noninternational armed conflict, government officials are internationally
responsible for violating Common Article 3 or, in the alternative,
responsible for violating customary international law as expressed in
Common Article 3.26

Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 85.1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
21
Geneva Convention I, supra note 19, at art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 19, at
art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, at art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
19, at art. 147.
22
Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 19, at art. 3 [collectively Common Article 3].
23
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 567 (2d ed. 1959).
24
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 114 ¶ 218 (June 27).
25
Common Article 3, supra note 22.
26
Id. Geneva Protocol II also deals with the rules of non-international armed conflict.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
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B. Sufficient Culpability or “Moral Choice” Is a Requisite for International
Criminality
Even if a war crime actually occurred, a legal advisor will not be
internationally responsible for illegal acts unless he has sufficient
culpability.27 The Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”) in the High
Command Case explained that the culpability requirement was extracted
from “fundamental principles of criminal law as generally accepted by
the civilized nations of the world.”28 Similarly, the IMT defined
culpability by asking whether the actor had a “moral choice.”29 Whether
the actor had a “moral choice” was determined by analyzing the actor’s
mens rea and his actual ability to influence policy.30
Accordingly, when a legal advisor has a high mens rea and a weak
ability to influence or ignore criminal policy, he is sufficiently culpable.
For example, this occurs when a legal advisor has actual knowledge of
the criminality of the policy.31 Actual knowledge32 satisfies the “moral
choice” standard because the legal advisor knows that one choice is
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol II].
27
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 484. The Nuremberg Military Tribunal
(“NMT”) in the High Command Case noted that the culpability requirement was extracted
from “fundamental principles of criminal law as generally accepted by the civilized nations
of the world.” Id. at 510. Thus, since mere association is not sufficient to support criminal
responsibility, strict liability does not satisfy the culpability standard. Id. at 511. A person
“cannot be held criminally responsible for a mere error in judgment as to disputable legal
questions.” Id.
28
Id. at 510.
29
The International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) acknowledged that the requisite
individual culpability is satisfied when a “moral choice was in fact possible.” MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 224. The NMT described the requisite culpability as “a personal
act voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under international law.”
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 510.
30
In essence, the mens rea analysis tests whether the actor understood that he had a
decision to make and the ability to influence policy tests whether the actor had the ability
to choose between right and wrong.
31
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 693. For example, in holding Lehmann
responsible for the criminality of the Commando Order, the NMT emphasized that
“[Lehmann] was well aware of the criminal nature of this order.” Id.
32
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) defines knowledge in two ways:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962). “When knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” Id. § 2.02(7).
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permissible and the other choice is illegal. Thus, the legal advisor has
the chance to choose the permissible action.
On the other end of the spectrum, if a legal advisor has a low mens
rea but a strong ability to influence criminal policy, he is also criminally
culpable. The axiom that ignorance of the law is no excuse speaks well
for this type of situation.33 At this level of mens rea, criminal
responsibility would apply “if [a legal advisor] can reasonably be
expected to know that the act is a crime.”34 Thus, the standard is
whether a reasonable legal advisor should have known that the policy
was criminal.35
In this respect, this Article contends that the reasonable legal advisor
standard is the general practice of legal advisors as recognized by
civilized nations.36 One can appreciate this by analyzing the High
Command Case and comparing the reasonable legal advisor with the
field commander of normal intelligence (“reasonable field commander”),
and the differing roles that they play in war. In the High Command
Case, the NMT reasoned that because the field commander performs in
active combat and does not have the full resources that are available to
legal advisors, a reasonable field commander “has the right to presume,
in the absence of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of

33
WOETZEL, supra note 18, at 119. “It is clear that ignorance of the criminal nature of the
act is no excuse . . . .” Id.
34
Id. This sounds very similar to the MPC definition of negligence. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to
perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s
situation.
Id.
35
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 512 (standard of “normal intelligence”). While
the NMT is referring to the standard applicable to a commanding officer, the main tenets of
the NMT’s analysis are equally applicable to a legal advisor. Especially important to note
is that the NMT specifically distinguishes the limited legal capacities of field commanders
in active combat from those of legal advisors. Id. at 511. Thus, this suggests that the
standard as to whether an order is “criminal upon its face” depends on the ordinary legal
facilities associated with a person acting within a specific duty. In the case of a legal
advisor, the ordinary legal facilities are greater than a field commander.
36
This Article adapts Article 38 of the ICJ statute to a legal advisor’s work product
standard. See U.N. CHARTER annex art. 38 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ].
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such orders has been properly determined before their issuance.”37
Thus, the NMT found it was excusable for a field commander to transmit
criminal orders during active combat when he passed the order down
the chain of command, unless the order was “criminal upon its face” or if
he actually knew the order was criminal.38 The NMT explained that an
order was “criminal upon its face” if a legal opinion was not necessary to
understand the illegality of the order.39
In contrast, a legal advisor is in a better position to influence policy:
a reasonable legal advisor is not generally in active combat and has the
faculties to better understand the legality of the policy. Thus, the legal
advisor may be culpable even when he does not actually know that the
policy is “criminal upon its face.” On the other hand, if, after diligent
research, a reasonable legal advisor may not be able to determine
whether an act is criminal, then he would be in a situation similar to that
of a reasonable field commander: he would not have the ability to
choose between right and wrong.
Finally, if the legal advisor has absolutely no ability to influence
criminal policy, then, no matter what his mens rea is, under the
policymaker rule he has no “moral choice” and would not be
internationally responsible for the war crimes that occur due to the
criminal policy.40 Such lack of “moral choice” occurs: (1) when the actor
has no ability to influence the policy;41 or (2) when a reasonable person
could not have acted any other way.42
The first circumstance occurs only if an actor does all that he could
but fails to resist the illegal policy. While Professor Woetzel suggests
that a tribunal may consider the “extent an individual could resist an
illegal order,”43 implying that something short of doing everything to
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 511.
Id. at 509; cf. Hostage Case, supra note 18, at 1236 (“[I]f the illegality of the order was
not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its
illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime exists and the inferior
will be protected.”). This “clearly criminal” or criminality “on its face” standard suggests a
recklessness standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
39
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 512.
40
Some tribunals seem to refer to this as an affirmative defense.
41
In the circumstance where the actor has no ability to influence the policy, it is unclear
whether the burden of proof is on the prosecution or the defense.
42
This is a claim of duress. According to the final judgment in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
“duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings . . . .” No. IT96-22, Appeals Chamber Judgment 4 (Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
43
See WOETZEL, supra note 18, at 118-19.
37
38
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resist the illegal policy would suffice, the Justice Case indicates
otherwise. Most telling is that in the Justice Case, Curt Rothenberger, the
State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Justice, was convicted of
“aid[ing] and abett[ing] in the program of racial persecution, and
notwithstanding his many protestations to the contrary [the NMT held
that] he materially contributed toward the prostitution of the Ministry of
Justice.”44
However, where an actor “protests” against the application of the
policy, “oppose[s] it in every way short of open and defiant refusal to
obey it” but the policy is still applied, the actor is not criminally
responsible for the resulting illegal actions connected to the policy.45 A
good example of an actor in this situation is von Leeb and his connection
to the Commissar Order.46 The Commissar Order resulted in the murder
of many commissars who opposed Hitler’s troops. The NMT held that
by expressing his opposition to the Commissar Order and by attempting
to thwart the enforcement of the Commissar Order by drawing attention
to the Maintenance of Discipline Order, von Leeb did all that he could
do, and therefore was not responsible for the resulting catastrophe of the
Commissar Order.47
The second circumstance where a lack of moral choice exists occurs
if a “reasonable man would apprehend that he was in such imminent
physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose the right and
refrain from the wrong.”48 In such a circumstance, the actor is not
personally responsible for the crime committed. According to the NMT
in the Einstazgruppen Case, the reasonable man would weigh the harm

United States v. Altstötter, (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), reprinted in 3 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10, at 1118 (1951) [hereinafter Justice Case]. Rothenberger was found “guilty of taking
a minor but consenting part in the Night and Fog [Decree],” which ordered the deportation
of civilians suspected of resistance activities so that they may be tried by special courts. Id.
The NMT found that despite being a public advocate of an independent judiciary and
publicly protesting against the Party and Gestapo officers from interfering with the judges
in pending cases, “he materially contributed toward the prostitution of the Ministry of
Justice and the courts and their subordination to the arbitrary will of Hitler, the Party
minions, and the police.” Id.
45
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 557.
46
Id. at 555-58.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 509.
44
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caused by obeying the illegal policy against the harm caused by
disobeying the illegal policy.49
Arguably, as Judge Cassese stated in his separate and dissenting
opinion in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, this balance sounds like one simply
must take the “lesser of two evils”;50 however, tribunal decisions have
required the illegal policy to be more than the lesser of two evils. For
example, in the Justice Case, even though “[t]he evidence conclusively
show[ed] that in order to maintain the Ministry of Justice in the good
graces of Hitler and to prevent its utter defeat by Himmler’s police,”
Franz Schlegelberger, Acting Reich Minister of Justice, was convicted
under counts two and three of the indictment.51 While it may have been
true that a worse man may have taken Schlegelberger’s place and that
Schlegelberger was the lesser of two evils, that was not a sufficient
justification to continue the illegal work demanded of him.
For several reasons, this is an onerous standard to meet. First, past
cases suggest that the tribunals will assume that a person has some type
of influence, in effect shifting the burden of proof onto the accused.52
Second, because the standard does not consider the actor’s subjective
view, the tribunal may disregard the irrationality that the actor may face
when attempting to reason whether the physical peril was imminent.53
Third, the reasoning that an actor must undergo before he is considered
to be deprived of the freedom to choose right from wrong is hardly
practical. First, the legal advisor must assess the imminence of the
physical peril and also evaluate the extent of damage the illegal order
would cause.54 Then, the legal advisor must compare the competing
United States v. Ohlendorf (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949), reprinted in 4 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10, at 471 (1950) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Case].
If the nature of the ordered act is manifestly beyond the scope of the
superior’s authority, the subordinate may not plead ignorance of the
criminality of the order. If one claims duress in the execution of an
illegal order it must be shown that the harm caused by obeying the
illegal order is not disproportionally greater than the harm which
would result from not obeying the illegal order.
Id.
50
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Cassese, ¶ 16 (Oct. 7, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
51
Justice Case, supra note 44, at 1086.
52
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 509 (emphasizing that this is a defense of
coercion or necessity). Thus, this Article considers this an affirmative defense.
53
Id.
54
Id. “The defendants in this case who received obviously criminal orders were placed
in a difficult position, but servile compliance with orders clearly criminal for fear of some
49
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factors and make a decision. This entire analysis must be based on
foresight, rather than a tribunal’s hindsight analysis. Such a task would
put anyone in a difficult position, but the NMT has said that being in a
“difficult position” is not enough.55
Finally, even if an actor in the second circumstance understood the
extent of harm, this balance must greatly favor obeying the illegal policy.
The NMT stated that “the harm caused by obeying the illegal [policy] is
not disproportionally greater than the harm which would result from not
obeying the illegal [policy].”56 Thus, unless the choice is to kill or be
killed, the balance does not seem to greatly favor obeying the illegal
policy.57 As a result, while an affirmative defense exists on paper, it
rarely meets reality.58
IV. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS
Concededly, there are many circumstances where legal advice is too
tangential to the creation or the implementation of the criminal policy for
the legal advisor to meet the requisite culpability for international
criminal responsibility. However, there are several situations where the
legal advisor acts under the guise of counsel but actually enters the
realm of establishing or implementing policy.
In this respect, this Article proposes that a high-ranking legal advisor
may be internationally responsible for his “advice” under two alternative
theories. The first theory, addressed in Scenarios One through Three, is
direct responsibility based on the legal advisor’s furtherance of a
criminal endeavor. This theory applies when a legal advisor gives
advice knowing that it will be used for an international criminal purpose
or to formulate an illegal policy. This is similar to standards established
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as set out by the American Bar
Association and is based on customary international law that finds
planning, instigating, ordering, committing, aiding, abetting, or pursuing

disadvantage or punishment not immediately threatened cannot be recognized as a
defense.” Id.
55
Id.
56
Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 49, at 471.
57
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Trial Chamber II Judgment, ¶ 17 (Mar. 5,
1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
58
While it may seem difficult to fathom a legal advisor finding himself in “imminent
physical peril,” judges and prosecutors may find themselves in this situation. See, e.g., id. at
954.
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a common international criminal purpose to be a war crime.59 The
second theory, addressed in Scenario Four, is command responsibility.
Unlike the first theory, this theory does not require that the advice be
criminal. Instead, it is based on the idea that the legal advice created a
“permissive climate” for illegal conduct.60
A. Scenario One: A Legal Advisor Incorporates His Own Criminal Idea into
the Final Version of the Policy
The simplest scenario is when a legal advisor incorporates his
criminal idea into the final version of the policy.61 In this situation, the
legal advisor is not even acting as a counselor. To the extent that the
legal advisor claims that he is simply giving legal advice, the “legal
advice” is merely a façade to hide his attempt to make criminal policy.
For example, the NMT found that Rudolf Lehmann’s criminal idea to
punish individuals that would have been acquitted by the judicial
process was integrated into the final version of the Barbarossa
Jurisdiction Order.62 Finding that Lehmann was the originator of the
idea, the NMT held “[Lehmann] responsible for [his] criminal connection
with, participation in, and formulation of [the Barbarossa Jurisdiction
Order].”63 The NMT also held Lehmann criminally liable for his

59
Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II Opinion and Judgment 249, ¶ 674
(May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
60
Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 691.
61
Several legal advisors at the annual Legal Advisers’ Meeting “stressed that the Legal
Adviser’s function was also part of the policy formulation process.” Hans Corell, Third
Legal Advisers’ Meeting at UN Headquarters in New York, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 323, 325 (1993).
Thus, the author suspects that legal advisors may, more often than not, encounter Scenario
One. The informal meeting, organized by the “Legal Advisers of the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs of Canada, India, Mexico, Poland and Sweden, and with the assistance of the Legal
Counsel of the United Nations,” is meant to create an atmosphere where legal advisors can
spontaneously debate over the developing issues in international law. Hans Corell, Legal
Advisers Meet at UN Headquarters in New York, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 371, 371-73 (1991).
62
See High Command Case, supra note 2, at 691-93. The Tribunal found that it was
Lehmann’s idea to completely deny jurisdiction to the courts, in effect giving the troops
complete discretion to dispose cases. Id. at 692-93. This “left the door wide open to the
decision of an officer of at least the rank of a battalion commander to impose such
collective punishments as he saw fit.” Id. at 692. Lehmann’s idea was particularly
important because, in his own words, “troops will get rid of just those cases which they
consider awkward, namely, the doubtful cases by handing them over to the courts.” Id. at
692-93. Thus, Lehmann intended to permit the punishment of individuals that would have
been acquitted for lack of evidence. Id. at 693. This, the IMT held, was criminal: “This
provision in the order . . . is one of the most vicious parts of the orders.” Id.
63
Id. “This provision in the order . . . obviously was not derived from Hitler, or Keitel,
or Jodi . . . .” Id.
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contribution in enlarging the scope of the original Terror and Sabotage
Decrees.64
Thus, where the legal advisor is the originator of the criminal idea
and that criminal idea becomes part of the final policy, the legal advisor
is then responsible for the resulting criminal policy.
B. Scenario Two: A Legal Advisor Compiles Other People’s Criminal Ideas
and Is the Main Factor in Determining the Final Version of the Policy
A legal advisor in Scenario Two compiles other people’s criminal
ideas into one concise criminal policy. 65
If the basic idea is criminal under international law, the
staff officer who puts that idea into the form of a
military order, either himself or through subordinates
under him, or takes personal action to see that it is
properly distributed to those units where it becomes
effective, commits a criminal act under international
law.66
A good example of a legal advisor in Scenario Two is Lehmann and
his connection to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, the Commando
Order, the Night and Fog Decree, and the Terror and Sabotage Decrees.67
A legal advisor’s responsibility in Scenario Two is supported by both
a deterrence and culpability rationale. The deterrence theory is based on
the fact that no matter how much authority one person has, he cannot
implement that policy by himself.68 Those who draft policy are
Id. at 695.
The NMT described it this way: “The basic criminal offense is in the essential part a
staff officer [or legal advisor] performs in making effective the criminal whole.” Id. at 693.
66
Id. at 513.
67
Id. at 691-95; see supra note 10 and accompanying text. Although Lehmann’s ideas
were incorporated into the Barbarossa Jurisdiction order, the NMT emphasized that
Lehmann was also responsible for his contribution to the final form of that order. High
Command Case, supra note 2, at 693. The Terror and Sabotage Decree was signed by
Lehmann and provided that all acts of violence by non-German civilians in occupied
territories are deemed to be acts of terrorism and sabotage and that all terrorists and
saboteurs should be shot down on the spot, all terrorists and saboteurs who are
apprehended must be handed over to the Security Police, and all women terrorists and
saboteurs who take no active part in the fighting must be employed as laborers.
68
The NMT recognized this in its analysis of crimes against peace. High Command
Case, supra note 2, at 486. “No matter how absolute his authority, Hitler alone could not
formulate a policy of aggressive war and alone implement that policy by preparing,
planning, and waging such a war.” Id.
64
65
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“indispensable” and an “essential contribution to the final execution” of
criminal policy.69 A person with a criminal idea necessarily needs other
people to help implement it by consolidating it into a coherent policy.
Thus, by deterring those key players, the originator of the criminal idea
will be greatly impeded from implementing the criminal idea.
In addition, a legal advisor in Scenario Two meets the requisite
culpability because there are two important features underlying Scenario
Two: (1) a legal advisor acting in this capacity has the obligation and
resources to detect the criminality of the ideas; and (2) a legal advisor
acting in this capacity has substantial influence over the final structure of
the criminal policy. First, unlike the intermediate administrative officer
who routinely transmits orders and has no time to screen the orders he
transmits, a reasonable legal advisor has time to deliberate over the
policies.70 Similarly, unlike field commanders, a reasonable legal advisor
has the time and resources to detect the illegality.71 In fact, a legal
advisor’s specialty is to determine the legality of a proposed conduct. As
such, if a reasonable legal advisor would understand that the policy is
criminal, he would have the requisite mens rea.
Second, unlike both the intermediate administrative officer and the
field commander, a legal advisor in Scenario Two has substantial
influence over the final structure of the criminal policy. Because the
legal advisor performs “fundamental and essential functions . . . in
producing a military order [and policy] from an original idea[,]”72 a legal
advisor is the “main factor in [implementing] the final form” of the
policy.73 A legal advisor acting in this capacity “modifie[s] those ideas
within his own sphere up to a certain point and place[s] the whole into
an effective military order which [is] transmitted to the troops and

Id. at 515.
See id. at 510 (explaining that the intermediate administrative function of transmitting
an order does not amount to the requisite personal guilt because “transmittal is a routine
function[,] . . . in many instances [it] would be handled . . . without being called to his
attention[,]” and the person transmitting “is not in a position to screen orders so
transmitted”).
71
See infra Part IV.D; cf. High Command Case, supra note 2, at 511 (explaining that
because a field commander makes decisions in active combat and has limited legal
facilities, “[a field commander] has the right to presume, in the absence of specific
knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been properly determined
before their issuance”).
72
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 691.
73
Id. at 693. As of 1939, customary international law made it criminal for the
participation of military officers at the policy influencing level. Id. at 489.
69
70
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carried out.”74 Therefore, a legal advisor has the requisite culpability to
be held accountable for the criminal policy.
C. Scenario Three: A Legal Advisor Attempts To Cover a Criminal Policy
with the Spin of Legality
In Scenario Three, a legal advisor is criminally implicated when he is
aware of the criminal nature of the policy, but nevertheless, attempts to
give it an appearance of legality.75 Scenario Three has at least two
variants. In the first variant, a legal advisor, knowing that the policy is
criminal, revises the criminal policy to give it an impression of legality.76
This is especially significant in modern international law because legal
advice is often an attempt to cover illegal policy with legal analysis.77
For example, Rudolf Lehmann was held criminally responsible for a part
of the Commando Order for “ma[king] certain suggestions as to methods
which might, by a strained construction, give some appearance of
legality and be suitable for publication; constructions which he
apparently did not believe himself.”78
In the second variant, a legal advisor, knowing that the policy is
criminal, justifies the legality of the criminal policy in hopes of
convincing other people that the criminal policy is actually legal.79 It
would seem that such an analysis could never amount to a war crime.
After all, it is the client who chooses to act. However, legal advice is
often requested to further a criminal endeavor.80 In some situations, a
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693-94.
76
See id.
77
Newman, supra note 1, at 287; see Stanko Nick, The Role of the Legal Adviser in Modern
Diplomatic Services, in MODERN DIPLOMACY (Jovan Kurbalija ed., 1998), available at
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Books/mdiplomacy_book/ (“It is significant that even
countries and their leaders who bluntly break fundamental rules and principles of
international law almost invariably make a considerable effort to wrap their acts in a
legally presentable or at least justifiable form.”).
78
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 693-94.
79
See MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 286. Often in a situation like this a legal
advisor is attempting to “assist or provide a ‘road map’” which amounts to complicity in
the criminal conduct. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 694 (citations omitted). Because
legal advisors often encounter this situation, the International Law Commission has
expressed doubt over the value of a legal advisor’s opinion as evidence of customary
international law. See Manley O. Hudson, Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 24, 30, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add. “Reserve may be needed in assessing the value of
[opinions of legal advisers] as evidence of customary international law, for the efforts of
legal advisers are necessarily directed to the implementation of policy.” Id.
80
Newman, supra note 1, at 287.
74
75
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reasonable legal advisor would understand that the most likely reason a
client would request advice on the specific issue is to avoid the
consequences of a crime already committed or a crime that may be
committed in the future.81 For example, von Ribbentrop was held
criminally responsible for justifying aggressive actions on Norway,
Denmark, and the Low Countries.82
Unlike the previous two scenarios, however, a legal advisor in
Scenario Three may not have the requisite culpability.83 First, because
the legal advisor is reviewing someone else’s final product, he has less
influence over the resulting policy. Second, the conduct of either
revising a policy to conform to international standards or justifying the
legality of the policy falls under genuine legal counsel. Thus, a more
demanding mens rea standard is required to prevent the presumption of
criminal responsibility based on mere association to the criminal policy.
Third, the most important reason for a higher mens rea standard in
Scenario Three is that the conduct alone may merely be a result of
negligence or mistake. Before a legal advisor counsels his client on the
legal consequences of a proposed conduct, the legal advisor must
determine what the law is at that time and then determine whether the
proposed conduct may violate the law.84 When the issue touches upon
public international law, the legal advisor must not only interpret
applicable treaties, but must also recognize “international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations, . . . [and] judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations . . . .”85 Thus, because the “law is not static, but by continual
81
Id. “There might be legitimate reasons for such a request, but the most likely reason
would be a desire to avoid prosecution for a committed crime.” Id.
82
See MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 286 (“Von Ribbentrop was advised in
advance of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries,
and prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggressive
actions.”); see Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 694 (analogizing von Ribbentrop’s issuance
of the memoranda justifying the attack to a legal advisor’s criminal actions).
83
As stated in Part III, supra, culpability is a function of both the legal advisor’s actual
ability to influence policy and the legal advisor’s mens rea.
84
This is similar to the two-part test that Judge Anderson expressed in his concurring
opinion in the Krupp Case. United States v. Krupp (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949), reprinted in 9
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 405 (1950) [hereinafter Krupp Case] (“(a) what was the law at the
time in question, and (b) does the evidence show prima facie that the defendants or any of
them violated it”).
85
Statute of the ICJ, supra note 36, at art. 38; see MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at
221.
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adaptation follows the needs of a changing world[,]”86 it is especially
difficult for a legal advisor to determine the current understanding of
issues not yet solidified by international consensus. In this respect,
knowledge that the policy is actually criminal would suffice. In
addition, if the policy were criminal on its face, a legal advisor would
have sufficient culpability to be held responsible for the policy.87
There are three practical reasons for applying criminality for
Scenario Three. First, a person knowledgeable in the law is the best
person to hide the criminality of the policy, thus making the crime more
difficult to detect.
Second, “there may be strong pressures on
government lawyers [or legal advisors] to ‘bend’ or ignore the law in
order to support policy decisions . . . .”88 If the legal advisor is not held
responsible for his advice, then he will not be deterred from caving into
these strong pressures, even when his legal insight strongly suggests that
the policy is criminal. Third, because “foreign policy decisions are often
highly political, and policymakers and others who influence policy are
often skeptical concerning the relevance of international law[,]”89 a legal
advisor who informs the government that the proposed conduct is most
likely illegal will have strong influence on the final policy decision. This
is especially so when the legal advisor is counseling a democratic, lawabiding country.90
D. Scenario Four: A Legal Advisor Creates or Implements a Policy, Which
While Not Illegal, Creates a Permissive Atmosphere for Criminal Conduct
Unlike the previous three instances where the legal advisor is held
responsible for his direct participation in a criminal conduct, in Scenario
Four, the legal advisor, if at all, is held criminally accountable based on

MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 221.
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 509. The NMT also suggested that believing the
policy to be criminal is sufficient. Id. at 693-94. However, if this is the case, how much faith
must a legal advisor have in the legality of a policy before he is willing to venture into
revising or justifying a policy? The author suggests that the NMT merely interchanged the
meaning of “belief” with “knowledge.” Otherwise, this would rely too heavily on the
reasonable legal advisor standard, which is quite malleable.
88
Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 693 (citations omitted); see C.G. WEERAMANTRY,
UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (2004) (“All too often at the highest levels of
government and foreign and military policy there is an expectation that legal opinions will
conform to the wishes of those in authority . . . .”).
89
Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 693 (citations omitted).
90
More and more States have a policy of abiding by international law. WEERAMANTRY,
supra note 88, at 211. “Signs are discernible at the highest levels of state policy of an
increased readiness to abide by the dictates of international law.” Id.
86
87
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the rubric of command responsibility.91 The best example of Scenario
Four is Field Marshall Wilhelm von Leeb’s connection to the Barbarossa
Jurisdiction Order in the High Command Case.92 As commander of his
army group, he put the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order into the chain of
command.93 The NMT concluded that even if the order was not
criminal, it “was at best ambiguous in respect to the authority conferred
upon a junior officer to shoot individuals who were merely suspected of
certain acts.”94 Furthermore, the NMT found that von Leeb did not
prevent the illegal application of the order by clarification or otherwise
by including further instructions.95 “Having set this instrument in
motion, he must assume a measure of responsibility for its illegal
application[,]” and thus he was indirectly responsible for failing to place
safeguards within the order.96
The theory behind command responsibility is twofold. First, “[b]y
doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of international
responsibility.”97 A legal advisor has the ability to influence the
application of the policy and probably understands that he has this
capability. Thus, when a reasonable legal advisor has reason to know
that although the policy is legal, the policy is ambiguous, he is just as
culpable as a person who implements the illegal policy. Second, in
implementing an ambiguous policy, the legal advisor has breached his
duty.98 Because the machinery of the government not only requires the
forging and implementation of policy but also the application of that
policy by others, a reasonable legal advisor should know that policy is
created so that others will follow that policy. Thus, the person in charge
of implementing that policy has the duty to ensure that the policy is
sufficiently definite.

91
Art. 2 of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
succinctly summarizes command responsibility. “An individual shall be responsible for a
[war] crime . . . if that individual . . . [f]ails to prevent or repress the commission of such a
crime in the circumstances set out in article 6 . . . .” Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art.
2.
92
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 521-25.
93
Id. at 560.
94
Id. For more information about the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, see supra note 62
and accompanying text.
95
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 560.
96
Id. at 560-61.
97
Id. at 512.
98
See Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable
Standard, 97 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) (emphasizing that command responsibility does not
attach unless the actor has breached a duty).
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Therefore, the doctrine of command responsibility requires that a
person, such as a legal advisor, who “knew or had reason to know, in the
circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was
going to commit such a crime[, must] . . . take all necessary measures
within [his] power to prevent or repress the crime.”99 Accordingly,
while the policy is not necessarily criminal under international law,
where a reasonable legal advisor would understand that the policy
creates a permissive atmosphere for criminal conduct, the legal advisor
should be held accountable for the actions that follow from that policy.
V. CONCLUSION
A person who leads others to commit a crime and the person who
actually commits the crime share equal culpability in the commission of
the crime.100 The NMT in the High Command Case succinctly described
it this way: “It is self-evident that national policies are made by man.
When men make a policy that is criminal under international law, they
are criminally responsible for so doing. This is the logical and
inescapable conclusion.”101 Furthermore, “[i]f the policy under which it
is initiated is criminal in its intent and purpose it is so because the
individuals at the policy-making level had a criminal intent and purpose
in determining the policy.”102 In addition, because the masterminds of
the criminal violations are not involved with the physical action of
committing the crime, failure to hold these individuals accountable for
their complicity would undermine the principle of deterrence. As “[t]he
acts prohibited are without deterrent effect unless they are punishable as
crimes[,]”103 holding those creating the elaborate scheme has significant
deterrent effect.
“We refuse to accept the notion that lawyers may do anything,
including violating the law, to zealously advocate their clients’ interests
and then avoid criminal prosecution by claiming that they were ‘just
doing their job.’”104 In many states in the United States, a legal advisor is
Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 6.
HARRIS, supra note 15, at 503.
101
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 490.
102
Id. at 486.
103
Hostage Case, supra note 18, at 1240.
104
In the United States, a lawyer is responsible for his advice to his client and may be
sued in civil court under professional malpractice. See, e.g., Doe v. Hughes, 838 P.2d 804
(Alaska 1992) (rendering a law firm guilty of professional malpractice because it breached
the duty of care owed to the client). Generally, a lawyer may also be disciplined by a
state’s highest court for professional misconduct. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
state that:
99

100
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domestically responsible for his work product. His responsibility flows
to his client and to the licensing authority that permits him to practice
law. In addition, when the legal advisor is counseling the government
on issues involving international law, the legal advisor has an obligation
not only to the general welfare of the citizenry105 and the specific
government agency requesting counsel,106 but also to the international
community.
Especially in this age of globalism, a legal advisor’s responsibility
necessarily extends to the international community.107
Because
“international law is not the product of an international legislature,”108
the legal advisor’s role is especially important. Therefore, when a legal
advisor takes a direct role in an international crime, he must be held
responsible for it. In addition, where the legal advisor takes a direct role
in a policy that, while technically legal, creates a permissive atmosphere
for illegal conduct, the legal advisor must be responsible for creating
safeguards to prevent the possibility of illegal conduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts
of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2004); see, e.g., In re Carnesi, 784 N.Y.S.2d 892
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (accepting attorney’s resignation and ordering that the attorney be
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys).
105
See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming defendant
lawyer’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States and obstruction of justice).
106
Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 693.
107
See generally Winston P. Nagan, Lawyers Roles, Identity, and Professional Responsibility in
an Age of Globalism, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 131 (2001) (explaining the various roles of a legal
advisor).
108
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 221.
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